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When, in 1994, a very close friend, the German 
historian Gunnar Hering, died, I looked again 
through his writings in order to prepare an 
obituary. Between books with voluminous 
documentation and thorough analysis, I found a 
little essay on a topic rather uncommon for him: 
the history of the Estonian artist Count Otto 
Magnus von Stackelberg (1788-1837), who 
had left his northern country to come south to 
Italy and Greece and paint landscapes and 
portraits.1 Between the lines of his text, the thing 
that jumped out was how my friend, in writing 
the history of the artist, had written his own 
history. He himself had been born in Dresden 
and gone to study the history, languages and 
cultures of Southeast Europe, soon becoming 
a specialist on the region and specifically on 
Greece. The similarity did not stop at external 
analogies, but was also there in the description 
of the experience and the interpretation of the 
behaviour, mentality and psychology of the 
artist. Knowing Gunnar well, I realized that in 
the plot, just as in the phrasal texture and as 
well as the style, there was something that 
connected him with the actions and events of 
this artist's life. 
Hering had written a faithful history of the artist 
and did not use it as a pretext to write his own 
history. If I could read his own history between 
the lines of the artist's history, it was because I 
recognized the phrases in which he described it, 
the same phrases which he had used, during our 
discussions, to describe his own experience. 
Then, I wrote a text with the title "Gunnar Hering 
Writing His Own Autobiography," in which I tried 
to show how Gunnar had written his own 
intellectual biography while writing the history of 
the artist.2 My conclusion was rendered through 
a metaphor, taken from painters' experience. 
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Writing history, I argued, is like whitewashing a wet wall. At the end of the effort, instead of pure 
whiteness, a map of rising damp has surfaced. Our own experience is like the dampness of the 
wall. It is coming through, even as we write the experience of historical otherness. I used this 
metaphor because writing our own history through the history of others is not a conscious 
process. The more we try to separate our sympathies and antipathies, the more we try to 
distance ourselves from our experience, the more this comes out from us in the writing of history. 
In Gunnar's obituary, I attributed this interweaving between history and autobiography specifically 
to the genre of biography. In writing a biography it is not easy to escape from the shape of our 
own imagined autobiography. I think now that this hidden connection more broadly effects all our 
historical writing, however subtly and indirectly. 
First of all, I would like to present some biographical facts. I was born in 1947 in Athens, in a 
working-class family. I was mixed up in Left politics from an early age. When I was sixteen years 
old I participated in student protests and street demonstrations, and was arrested for the first 
time. At eighteen, I wrote articles in a journal of the Trotskyist Left. I enrolled in the School of 
Philosophy of the University of Thessaloniki. When the dictatorship came, we organized a 
resistance group along with fellow students and a few workers. In 1969,1 was arrested - 1 was 
twenty-two - and sentenced to life imprisonment. I would stay in prison for four years, which I 
consider formative ones. Behind the walls I found a community of political prisoners who had an 
intense intellectual life. These were the years after the 1968 student revolt in Europe, after the 
split of the Communist Party of Greece and the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia. There were 
many discussions about these events, about the redefinition of the identity of the Left, and about 
fresh ideas and sensibilities coming out of the New Left and Eurocommunism. In prison there 
were also scholars and upper-class intellectuals who had no connections to the traditional cul-
ture of the Left, but possessed a wide knowledge of Western European progressive and liberal 
trends of the '60s. Consequently, these four years served as a school. We read a lot, I learned 
foreign languages and my readings mainly centred on philosophy and history. During those years 
I systematically read basic Left texts like Marx's Capital, and Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, but 
also Wittgenstein's Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Braudel's Mediterranean and Hobsbawm's 
Primitive Rebels. I was reading the new American Left like Baran and Sweezy and their journal 
Monthly Review, as well as Fanon, Freud, Markuse and others. I still have on my bookshelves 
Alexander Cockburn and Robin Blackburn's Student Power (Penguin 1969), with the permission 
number of the ministry of justice to receive it in jail, "34085/3-4-73." 
The experience of being in prison is formative for the personality. The prison as an institution is 
an arena of rivalry. On the one hand, the prison authorities try to decompose your identity through 
the control of your body, your movements, your communication with the outside world. They cat-
egorize you; they put you in special wards together with people marked like you. On the other 
hand, prisoners are not passive objects moulded by the technology of imprisonment. They react 
and have their own mechanisms by which they annihilate the prison's plans and try to impose 
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their own culture and norms of behaviour. They resist the prison's categorization simply by the 
fact that any categorization creates communities, and communities create a dynamic response 
by constructing their own intellectual and emotional space. Besides that, prisoners react by 
categorizing the overall prison experience not as an accident, but as a component in their 
collective life's imagined shape. In Greece, with a long history of political imprisonment after the 
interwar years, a prison culture flourished. But this culture was not a spontaneous reaction to the 
pain of punishment. It was formed by communist discourse on prison and by the party appara-
tus that fostered the identity of political prisoners. This protection was at the same time a mech-
anism of repression. There were topics not permitted for discussions, forms of culture prohibit-
ed, ideas vetoed, people outcast from the prisoners' community. What we could call the sphere 
of the "personal" was completely subordinated to the sphere of politics, to the promise of the 
great upheaval. Identity was created at odds with subjectivity. For dissidents, there was a sec-
ond prison inside the prison. But in the 1970s, the older mechanism had almost disappeared 
because of the split of the Communist Party in 1968. There were two rival communist parties, 
and at the same time, other Left or centre-Left groups. All those, though distinct communities, 
were in open communication. This plurality left not negligible margins of freedom, but a new-born 
freedom inside the Left, which helped the self-orientation of the prisoners. Prisoner identity was 
nuanced by subjective differences. Nevertheless, there existed a common prison culture. It would 
be summarized in a small poem of simple directions: "Eat your food, love your cell and read a 
lot." With this in mind, time in prison was not simply a time lost from life, but a time for the prac-
tice of self-discipline and preparation for the militant future.3 
This culture also cultivated a particular kind of "theory of knowledge." The Left had created a universe 
of knowledge, similar in form, if different in content, from what Frances Yates described in The Art of 
Memory (1966) about late medieval Western Europe. During the first half of the twentieth century, it 
had empowered people to overcome the deficiencies of their class educational background. In the 
'60s, it seemed to be a rather closed system, a residual of the past, and it had disappeared in the 
young generations of activists. But it was not a dead intellectual tradition, and it left a utilitarian ori-
entation toward learning. That is, you ought to learn with a purpose: to overturn the world. It seems 
strange, of course, that you tried to read Wittgenstein or Braudel with this view, but that was the 
manner in which we approached knowledge. Later, of course, looking again at these same texts with 
another eye, we understood that the basic characteristic of this approach was not learning, but mis-
understanding. Nevertheless, we tried hard, asking for books from friends and relatives outside prison 
and studying in the cell. The things we understood depended on the framework of our outlook. This 
framework was transformed by what we read, but not in a linear or cumulative way. As I see these 
inner processes now, I can understand our difficulty in reconciling our desires with existing realities. 
This un-bridged gap between desires and realities resulted in a pursuit of the uncommon, the alter-
native image of things, eventual hidden dynamics. As a consequence, with the passing of time and 
our disillusionment with reality, this search for an alternative way of knowing things was coupled with 
doubt and later transformed into skepticism about the possibility of understanding the reality. 
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Students in Court, Salonica, February 1970. First line, Katsaros, Darveris, Mitafidis, Liakos (standing) 
(photo: Der Spiegel, 20, 1970) 
I came out of prison in 1973 and continued to be politically active until 1977. Nevertheless I had 
a feeling of frustration, of political stagnation, or better, of political suffocation. This might seem 
strange, because the years after the fall of the junta were years in which democracy was 
established in Greece, and certainly a democracy of better quality than had existed before the 
dictatorship. However, few of us in the resistance against the junta went on to pursue a political 
career. The new world which we faced coming out of the prison door seemed strange to us. Most 
returned to their jobs and were sunk in psychological crises of varying depth and intensity. There 
was a diffused feeling that the expected revolution had not come and its time had passed. The 
social hierarchies were restored. Our own efforts and plans had failed. A comrade and close 
friend, Tasos Darveris, who later committed suicide, wrote a book on the experience of the 
dictatorship years entitled History of a Long Night 1967-1974* In the conclusion, he wrote that 
in the period of the dictatorship we felt freer because we could freely plan our hopes. This 
freedom to imagine the future has been restricted ever since. In what has been written in the form 
of memoirs of this period, there was a certain irony towards our experience itself. The basic idea 
was that those things for which we had sacrificed years of our life had happened without us, but 
also in ways different than we had expected. In the last paragraph of his book, Darveris wrote: 
"We are living with the past. The past is projected and depicted in the present and even in the 
future, it gives us a raison d'être. Is it inconsistency? Living without purpose, it is not what we 
are going to do in the future, but what we have done in the past, that burdens us. The past 
replaces the future. We had been dramatis personae in History's theatre company! Let's drink to 
the Past."51 did not completely share this attitude. Loving my past, I tried instead to get myself 
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free from it, tried to push it under my pillow. Ever since then, I do not talk publicly or write about 
my resistance and prison experience, and I do not take part in veterans' associations or activi­
ties. I resent feeling like someone belonging to the past. I think that this ambivalence towards the 
past defined my relation to history as an open question. I'll return later to this point. 
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When I closed the chapter on my political activity, I was feeling the need to see and think about 
things again from the beginning. I wanted to start a systematic study of philosophy or history, 
but I was wavering between the two. If finally I turned to history, it was not only because of the 
burden of the past. History seemed to offer a less unstable ground for understanding than 
philosophy did. Reading the writings of my friends who had turned to philosophy, in spite of a 
shift to a language of academic Marxism, I could distinguish, not without ennui, the same 
discussions that we had had in the language of political activism. In the Greek intellectual 
stardom of the 70s, the two shining names in philosophy were Nikos Poulantzas and Cornelius 
Castoriades. The best of Castoriades was what his teacher in politics, Agis Stinas, had 
elaborated after the end of World War II. I met Stinas several times in 1966-67 and was 
impressed by the figure of this isolated old militant, by his eloquence and distance from com-
monplace ideas about history and politics. In Poulantzas, a respectable personality, it was the 
lack of historicity and fluidity inherent to structuralism that turned me off. I understood why, later 
on, reading E. P. Thompson's polemic on Althusser. E. P. became my ideal historian. 
I decided to return to university in order to work on a doctoral thesis, but first I had to choose a 
subject. As a leftist researcher, I could choose a subject related to the history of the Greek labour 
movement, about which very little had been written up to that time, or I could even study the 
resistance or the civil war, which for the Left was a celebrated period. But what I feared was that 
I would repeat myself, that I could not escape from my ideas, and even from the rhetoric that I 
was using in my political writings up to that time. It is not strange that, even now, sometimes I 
recognize in my texts, particularly in polemics, modalities of writing belonging to different 
phases of my intellectual life. So, I was thinking that I should choose a period and a subject that 
were far from my experience, which would not affect me, and in which I could craft the intellec-
tual tools of the historian. In some way, I wanted to close the chapter on the political activism in 
which I had been occupied almost exclusively for twelve years since 1965. 
I wrote a thesis which had as its subject the relation between the Greek and Italian national move-
ments. In the 70s, nationalism was not yet the hot and politicized subject it became in the '90s. 
The research focused on the nineteenth century - far enough away from the political activities of 
my experience. The subject was the relation between Risorgimento and the Greek Great Idea, the 
connections of Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi and others to the Greek and Balkan politicians and 
intellectuals of those years. This subject seemed to me uninteresting enough that I could work 
on it while avoiding ideas emerging from political and social topics of the twentieth century, 
which were close to my experience. But reading the book I wrote afterwards, I understood that 
matters were not so simple. First of all, the choice of subject. In 1969, the security forces of the 
dictatorship had captured me in an apartment at 45 Garibaldi Street in Thessaloniki. I had no idea 
at the time exactly who Garibaldi was. But when I was in prison it happened that I read his 
biography in a pocket edition.6 Reading this book I felt a connection between the personality of 
Garibaldi and the film / Bravi di Brancaleone, in which Vittorio Gasman starred. This film belonged 
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in some way to the micro-mythology of our resistance group. Those ot us who founded this 
group had our first discussion after we had seen this film in a Thessaloniki cinema in the 
summer of 1967.7 Often sarcastic towards ourselves and our activities, we likened ourselves to 
the comic heroes of Brancaleone. Great words - poor results. Disproportionality between means 
and outcomes. An ineffectiveness, somehow comic and ironic at the same time. Consequently, 
I saw Garibaldi as one of those gallant fellows. Reading my thesis later I understood that I had 
written a history of failed endeavours. Neither Greek nor Italian heirs of the 1848 radicals 
managed to provoke the generalized uprising in the Balkans which they sought. In Greece, the 
first monarchy had been overthrown not for a radical republic, but to set up a rather corrupt 
sovereign regime of political parties. In Italy, a unified nation-state was set up, but with little rela­
tion to the expectations and efforts of Partito α" Azione. The history of the last days of Mazzini 
struck me. The day of the declaration of the unification of Italy, with Rome as capital, was not the 
fulfillment of the prophecy he himself had alone preached long before. Just released from prison, 
he retired to a hotel room, closed the windows and, after a short while, he died alone. 
Romantic interpretation of history? Yes. But unconsciously, writing about this story, I had 
returned to our own story. The attempts of small groups, the asymmetry between means and 
outcomes, the things that changed without them, the thwarting of their hopes. The history 
of failures. Ever since, I think so much of what I have written has been about the histories of failed 
efforts. In the conclusion of the book I had written the following: "The people of the drama do not 
exist outside of their roles; they look at the world through the myth they created. Their deeds must 
not be judged by their effectiveness. We must decipher them and read them as a text of mytho­
logical language of the national ideology."8 In a history that is the history of human activity, the 
measure is not its effectiveness but its social imaginary. In this phase of my thinking, the theory 
that influenced me most was that of Roland Barthes. Semiotics interested me from the perspec­
tive not of reading, but of misreading. Not of the obvious meaning, but of the indirect, hidden one. 
The indirect meaning is considered more important than the direct one. Thus, the personal 
experience of the discrepancy between means and results, the recognition of misreading and 
misunderstanding not as accidental but as structural to communication, was transferred to the 
book. The repressed was returned as history writing, but neither in justification nor in contempt 
of the past, but as intellectual elaboration of the asymmetry between the aims and consequences 
of human actions, that is, as irony. Through the writing of this book I came to view irony as an 
essential way of re-enacting history. 
The story could end here. I have no intention of writing my intellectual biography, only of describ­
ing an aspect of the relationship between personal experience and history writing. Besides that, 
I am sceptical of the possibility of unity in the intellectual autobiography. To the degree that our 
personal history is crystallized in our writings, in the same way, our personality is forged through 
our history-writing activity. From this point of view, what we are living does not have priority over 
what we are studying. They are both experiences of no different nature, and sometimes the life 
of learning determines the practice of living.9 History writing becomes a formative experience. 
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After I finished my first book, it seemed normal to continue studying the history of Italy and 
Greece. The field of their political, intellectual and economic relations was still unexplored. Indeed 
I had done some research on the fascist period, in the Italian archives, and I even discussed my 
project with Renzo de Felice, a very well known specialist on fascism. But what seemed more 
attractive and even compelling to me was to turn to social history. The study of social history and 
especially of the labour movement was like a promissory note that had to be settled. In the 
history of social movements, engagement with the history of the movement is, in a way, a sub-
stitute for engagement with the movement itself. The last time that I realized this was in 1998, in 
Milan, at the Annual Conference of the International Association of Labour History Institutions. 
There I met many old acquaintances from all over Europe. In the 70s, I knew them as militants. 
Now they had become gray-haired historians or archivists of the labour movement. At that time, 
they tried to realize their ideas, now they laboured to preserve them in the archives and to 
memorialize them.10 
Political engagement in the '60s and 70s was determined by an idea that now even the more 
radical groups of the Left have abandoned: the idea of social revolution, of turning the world 
upside down. The "de-radicalization" of the Left during the last two decades and the silencing of 
this dimension of our experience represents a spectacular shift in mass mentalities and political 
culture, which had preserved a dimension of social overturning for several decades after 1917. 
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, we ended up having succumbed to various 
aspects of the till then discarded ideas of social reform. Social reform and not social revolution, 
"reformist" Left and not revolutionary Left, became the political project of most of my generation. 
Turning to social history I took, as central to my work, the history of social reform and questioned 
its effectiveness and limits in Greece during the interwar years. I went to Geneva to investigate 
the archives of the International Labour Office, where I found an interesting story. The ILO, born 
after the First World War as an international bureaucracy, had used Greece and its difficulties with 
refugees after 1922 to perform an experiment in social engineering. Contrary to expectation, I 
argued, social welfare in Greece was not the product of the relationship between labour and 
capital, but the by-product of attempts to deal with the problems of refugees, public health and 
social security. 
During the years I was preparing the book Politics and Labour in the Interwar Years, between 
1987 and 1993,11 the international situation changed dramatically, and the changes provoked 
great transformations in social history and social theory, some of which we still hesitate to 
recognize. I mean the collapse of the Soviet world, on the one hand, and on the other, the crisis 
of the welfare state and the appearance of neo-liberalism as a political model in Western 
societies. What were the consequences for the theoretical interpretation of the welfare state? 
Previously, mainly in the 1960s and 70s, the model of social theory was based on the prospect 
of a future convergence of bureaucratic capitalism and reformed socialism. This idea was based, 
on the one hand, on the adoption of Keynesian planning by Western countries, and, on the other, 
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on the economic reforms in the Soviet bloc, after Stalin's death. From the perspective of 
convergence, the welfare state was considered a transitional form towards a rationally planned 
society. However, the popularity of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union demonstrated that previous theoretical frameworks were no longer adequate to explain 
social reform and the welfare state, and new frameworks were needed. 
The basic idea that pervades the book is that the emergence of working people, and more 
generally of the populations to which industrialization and urbanization gave rise, as well as of 
great waves of refugees in the early twentieth century, forced European societies to find space 
and institutions to fit these new elements into the social pyramid. Therefore, the need for social 
reform did not originate only from the labour movement, but from many forces, and was linked 
to the way that each society constructed the national state. Nevertheless, through these inter-
connected or oppositional tendencies, a general one emerged, and this was the expansion of the 
state into new areas, and chiefly into the regulation of social needs. This tendency for the state 
to expand, beyond the expectations of the social actors, met a more general tendency that 
originated from within society: namely, the shift of needs from the private to the public sphere. 
Needs, from birth to death, were politicized; they became an object of regulation by the state and 
were incorporated into different ideologies. 
In my approach, the expansion and the restriction of the state was sketched like a reverse U curve 
that lasted about a century from the last decades of the nineteenth century until the final decades 
of the twentieth. The apex of this curve took different colours, among which social democracy, 
communism, corporativism, even versions of fascism, and planned economy appeared, with 
corporativism as the common element. This scheme led to another idea that developed from my 
reading of Karl Polanyi's book, The Great Transformation (1944). In this book an economic 
anthropology is developed that places the mechanisms and mentalities of the market in juxtapo-
sition to an organic perception of society that has much greater depth than the market. One of 
the chapters of this book, "The Speenhamland Low," describes the impasse of this juxtaposition. 
The market creates destructive forces in society to which not only the labour movement, but also 
conservative forces are opposed. In addition, labour demands are formed on the basis of a value 
system that originates from what E. P. Thompson called the "moral economy." On the other 
hand, however, exit from the market provokes a still greater catastrophe. I saw the welfare state 
through this interplay between forces incorporating and detaching from the market. This inter-
pretative framework was delineated in two articles which I also wrote in this period. 
The first one was "On Populism" and constituted a critique of the concept of populism in 
theories of modernism in Greek politics.12 In this article I tried to see populism as an ideology 
derived from the handling of the popular "moral economy" by state elites in a period of market 
extension into society. The second one had the title, "Should we redefine the concept of the 
Left?"13 The question was not why communism collapsed, but why the reform of the regime 
failed. Written immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, this article described 
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the problem as the contradiction between the idea of the rational project which the Left(s) 
proposed (regardless of its rationality) and market self-regulation. From this perspective, I 
described the labour movement, socialism, the welfare state, and the expansion of the state itself 
in society as shades of an older reaction to social changes generated by the market. 
Nevertheless, this reaction, which lasted about a century (beginning in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century), proved a temporary retreat from the market. The end of the twentieth 
century saw the victorious return of the market in a worldwide climax. 
Finishing my book on labor politics in 1993, I did not proceed with social history, despite my 
earlier intentions. Again I was feeling the need to elaborate my open questions with the past, as 
this past was being transformed from a living past into an archived one. Maybe the symbolic 
act of this ambivalence towards my past was the act of giving my personal archive from the 
period of my political engagement and imprisonment to the Archives of Contemporary 
Social History in Athens. 
I was starting to explore, through the history of historiography, the problem of what we mean and 
what we do when we say that we are doing history. How could we explain the word "history"? 
What are the meanings, the intellectual pre-positions and the social preconditions of historicizing? 
The basic axis of my studies and seminars was the shift of attention from the object of history to 
the subject which makes history. That is to say, the reorientation of our view from the past as 
past, to the present (to every present) which historicizes its past. There were many causes for 
this turn. Scepticism about the possibility of history to understand realities was generated not 
only by the effects of the great changes after 1989 on ideas and convictions which seemed till 
then self-evident, but on changes in the intellectual environment too. In those years, cultural 
anthropology and literary criticism had introduced the role of the subject in the study of its object. 
Fellow historians were accustomed to the psychoanalyst's couch, and we approached the 
process of auto-historicization in the analysis of trauma. Many diverse currents contributed to the 
turn: from T. H. Kuhn to Foucault, from Derrida and Hayden White to the whole debate on 
"linguistic turn" and discussions on memory and subjectivity. All these reading experiences had 
as a common element the need to understand not the past as past, but our relationship to it, the 
multiple ways we produce the past and we transform it into history. 
However, the transfer of our attention from the object of history to the subject which produces it, 
should not be limited to the study of individual historians. If it has meaning, the question is how 
historians place themselves in history as a specific form of knowledge, as a particular discourse, 
since history depicts a relation with the past, and this relation has a social character. The struc-
ture of the sense of historical time is the nucleus of this perception, and this sense of historical 
time is not only a product of historians. The historians swim, in a certain way, inside this sense 
of time. But how is this feeling of time created? A first step in thinking about this was taken in an 
extensive paper on the construction of national time in modern Greek history-making.14 
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HISTOREIN 
I started to examine the meaning of the term history. In the prologue of historical works, from 
Herodotus to Braudel, from the pursuit of objectivity in Thucydides to the search of subjectivity 
in Passerini, things being sought from history are very different. The same if we examine the 
development of the term history: It ebbs and flows continuously from the subjective perception 
of narrative to the objective theory of the res gestae. For the "people without history," the diver-
gences from what we usually call history are even greater. The name and form of history that 
developed in Western Europe after the nineteenth century were imposed outside Europe, first 
through colonization and, second, through the creation of nation-states. The colonialists wrote 
histories of other peoples in the Western manner, and on the other hand, the transformation of 
those peoples into nations led them to reproduce history not in their own indigenous manner, but 
in the Western one. This is not simply a matter of the adoption of the Western style of historiog-
raphy. The crucial thing is that in Western historiography a formidable hierarchy of history devel-
oped. Western supremacy in the world was accompanied by a stigmatization of those peoples 
and cultures at the bottom of or outside this hierarchy. This stigma was experienced as trauma 
and was part of the construction of identity. Trauma was produced by Western historiography 
and expressed in a negative consciousness. That is, in a hetero-definition of the self. The para-
dox is that the trauma created by historiography was answered by history writing. National 
historiography is connected with the healing of trauma. Potentially, through the relation of trauma 
and history, we can answer the question why we do history. But this answer implies a new ques-
tion. Do we write history to repress our traumas or to heal them? In any case, in attempting to 
repress them - and this is the central idea of this text - our traumas return as history.15 
In Greek mythology there is a myth about history. The patroness of History is a muse, Clio. 
Clio is one of the nine daughters of Mnemosyne. The aim of the Muses is to make people 
forget their worries, to forget the traumas of which Mnemosyne reminds them. This could 
happen with the arts as well as with the narration of other histories. In mythology, history 
serves as medicine in relation to memory. If our memory carries traumatic experiences, one 
aim of history is to heal them. 
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